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THE CREDITORS’ BARGAIN RECONSTITUTED:
COMMENTS ON BARRY ADLER’S THE
CREDITORS’ BARGAIN REVISITED

EDWARD J. JANGER †
In his book, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, Thomas Jackson asserts
that bankruptcy law should approximate the bargain creditors would strike at the
initiation of the firm (T1) regarding the possibility that the firm might later fail
and default on its debts (T2).1 Jackson reasons that the firm’s creditors would
choose a collective remedy that limits the power of individual creditors to force an
inefficient liquidation. They would agree to stop the race of diligence.
In his thoughtful and provocative contribution to this symposium, The
Creditors’ Bargain Revisited, Barry Adler asks whether, in the current world of
finance and bankruptcy, creditors would choose the same collective remedy?2 His
answer is, “No.” As he sees it, creditors would prefer the unfettered right to
exercise their negotiated remedies.3 Barry offers three pieces of evidence: (1)
sophisticated creditors frequently say that they would prefer to opt out of
collective bankruptcy in favor of individual collection;4 (2) creditors frequently
seek to adopt bankruptcy remote structures such as securitization through special
purpose vehicles to avoid the bankruptcy process;5 and (3) blanket (often second)
lien financing is frequently used by undersecured creditors to control and
implement an all asset sale.6 Instead, he posits his preferred, noncollective,
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approach to insolvency: an express bargain based in creditor autonomy, or as he
puts it, “a contractual alternative to bankruptcy.”7
My response proceeds in three steps. First, I channel Inigo Montoya from The
Princess Bride to suggest that the “Creditors’ Bargain” does not mean what Barry
thinks it means. 8 Second, I situate Barry’s contractualism in relation to the alternate
“collective” theories of bankruptcy value distribution: the relativism of Baird and
Casey; and a more rigorous version of the creditors’ bargain articulated by me and
Melissa Jacoby in previous work.9 Third, I argue for the normative superiority of
the collective approach, both for its fidelity to the Creditors’ Bargain heuristic and
because of its consistency with a broader set of corporate governance norms that
seek to encourage adequate capitalization and risk internalization.10
I. THE ORIGINAL POSITION: THE “CREDITORS’ BARGAIN” DOES
NOT MEAN WHAT BARRY THINKS IT MEANS
Barry is, without a doubt, correct that creditors would prefer a debtor–creditor
regime that leaves their individual remedies intact. However, the lesson that Barry
derives about collective remedies rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of
Jackson’s Creditors’ Bargain. Barry uses creditors’ expressed opinions and their
behavior, as manifested in a number of emerging credit patterns, as evidence that
the Jackson’s hypothetical bargain theory is wrong.11 But Jackson never claimed
that the Creditors’ Bargain was a majoritarian rule. He never asked what creditors
actually wanted in the real world (then or now); creditors in the real world always
want as much as they can get, both in terms of leverage and priority. The
Creditors’ Bargain heuristic, instead, asks what certain ideal creditors would want
under a specific set of circumstances.
Jackson posits a specialized version of John Rawls’s hypothesized “original
position.” In A Theory of Justice, Rawls imagines a world where stakeholders
bargain over the just legal regime for their society from behind a “veil of
ignorance.”12 Jackson applies Rawls’s thought exercise to creditors, imagining the
hypothetical bargain that would arise in T1 (the initial capitalization of the firm),
if: (1) creditors are rational; (2) they do not know who they will be in T2 (when/if
the firm becomes insolvent and defaults); and (3) they anticipate value destruction
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WILLIAM GOLDMAN, THE PRINCESS BRIDE 114 (Mariner Books 2007).
Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 11, 96
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in T2 when individual creditors rush to dismember the debtor.13 Unsurprisingly,
Jackson concludes, that the creditors would chose a regime that solves the
collective action problem and leads to a governance system that can achieve value
maximization subject to Pareto superiority, thereby making all claimants better
off.14
Barry, by contrast, claims that actual creditor preferences are an indication of
the failure of the creditors’ bargain heuristic.15 But Jackson was never talking about
real world creditors; he posited “hypothetical creditors” making a hypothetical
governance decision.16 Barry’s real-world creditors who abjure collectivism are
not, nor do they want to be, in the “original position.” Instead, they are trying to
break through the veil of ignorance. They seek to predetermine, in T1, who they
will be in T2. This violates a condition essential to justifying the Creditors’
Bargain’s claim of normative superiority. Rawls’s theory of justice is sometimes
referred to as, “I cut, you choose” justice. It is axiomatic that the creditor,
bargaining in the original position for an insolvency regime, does not get to pick
who they will be in T2. After all, the chooser always wants more pie.
If Rawls’s assumption of ignorance is relaxed, bargaining over social welfare
devolves into special pleading. Whether creditor preferences are welfare
enhancing will turn on the structure of the market. If creditors know who they will
be in T2, only three types of creditors will prefer individual action: those who can
ensure the benefit of their bargain because they can ensure their position at the
top of the distributional hierarchy; those who can ensure that they have sufficient
power in T2 to solve the collective action problem all by themselves; and, even
better, those who can do both. Barry’s first example, the ABS lender, falls into the
first category.17 His second example, the blanket lien lender, can sometimes satisfy
both conditions.18 As a response to this possible critique, Adler invokes Modigliani
and Miller’s “irrelevance hypothesis,” saying the benefit offered by one
stakeholder in return for a distributional preference will be offset when other
stakeholders demand compensation for any additional risk.19 But this is only true
if the bargaining in T1 is not affected by: the ability to externalize—to shift the
cost of the risk to other parts of the capital structure; or the need of the debtor to
signal creditworthiness by offering stronger than optimal remedies.20 Both of

13 JACKSON, supra note 1, at 17 n.22.
14 Id. at 17. He also argues for a regime that minimizes distortions to pre-bankruptcy entitlements.
15 See Adler, supra note 2, at 1855.
16 JACKSON, supra note 1, at 70.
17 See Adler, supra note 2, at 1855.
18 Id. at 1864 n.25.
19 Id. at 1855; see also Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and
the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261–97 (1958).
20 This is what Rich Levin termed the “Thaler” problem: behavioral biases such as optimism may

distort the bargaining in T1. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
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these concerns have been raised elsewhere. Barry acknowledges the first by
positing a priority for tort claimants over consensual liens, discussed later, and
does not respond to the second.
In short, Barry’s examples do not suggest that the collective remedy suggested
by the Creditors’ Bargain heuristic is undesirable or inefficient. Indeed, quite the
contrary, they represent examples of the race of diligence and demonstrate the
need for a mandatory collective remedy, if anything, perhaps earlier in the process.
II. CONTRACTUALISM, RELATIVISM, AND ABSOLUTE PRIORITY:
“ABSOLUTE PRIORITY” DOES NOT MEAN WHAT
BARRY THINKS IT MEANS
In addition to value maximization, any normative theory of bankruptcy must
address the question of value distribution: who has first claim to value of the firm?
Here, Adler, Jackson, and the Bankruptcy Code diverge in their use of
terminology. The term at issue is “priority”—in particular, the term “absolute
priority.”21 It is crucial to use those terms consistently if one is to compare
contractual and collective proposals.
A. Priority—Rawls, Jackson and the Butner Short-Cut
With regard to priority, Jackson’s Creditors’ Bargain again starts with Rawls,
but does not finish there. Rawls used the original position to motivate the socalled “difference principle” as a prerequisite for any inequality in resource
allocation. He argued that a person in the original position would prefer equal
distribution of resources, unless a proposed inequality would either benefit all, or
at least makes nobody worse off.22 In bankruptcy, Rawls’s difference principle
suggests that all creditors would agree to equal (proportional) distribution of assets
in T2, unless inequality was both value-maximizing and Pareto superior. Under
this view, the goals of value maximization and fair distribution in T2 would lead
the bargainers in the original position to establish the limits of real world
bargaining in T1. This would suggest imposing a condition of Pareto superiority
on any deviation from a pari passu distribution.
Jackson does not go this far. In early work, Jackson famously posed the “puzzle
of secured credit.” He asked whether secured credit was efficient, and if it was, why
everyone didn’t use it? But neither he, nor his successors, ever answered that
question.23 Instead, Jackson, working with Baird, found a doctrinal punt—
DECISIONS ABOUT WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2008). I think there may be an even more fundamental
problem imposed by the need to signal that optimism to the creditor.
21 Sometimes referred to as the Boyd rule. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
22 RAWLS, supra note 12, at 65-66.
23 Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88
YALE L.J. 1143, 1146 (1979).
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federalism. They used the so-called “Butner principle” to bracket the inquiry. 24 In
Butner, the Supreme Court stated that bankruptcy entitlements should
presumptively track preexisting state law entitlements, unless there was a federal
bankruptcy interest to the contrary. 25 Baird and Jackson chose to assume, based on
this dicta, that the distributional baseline should be set at the moment of
bankruptcy by reference to existing state law entitlements.26 Deviations from the
state law baseline should be allowed only if they were both efficiency enhancing
and made no claimant worse off.27 This led to the primary Jacksonian distributional
prescription—respect the priority of claims, as determined under state law,
including those of secured creditors. 28
B. Absolute Priority—Colloquialism v. The Code
Jackson’s prescription to respect state law entitlements is sometimes
shorthanded as “absolute priority,” but the term is a bit of a misnomer.29 Not all
priorities are created equal either in Jackson’s thought experiment or in the real
world. Both Barry’s “contractualism” and his rejection of collectivism turn on a
definition of the term “absolute priority,” that, while widely used, is not reflected
in the Bankruptcy Code, achievable under state law, nor (though this is not Barry’s
point) compelled by the Creditors’ Bargain.30
Adler’s contractualism assumes a distributional scheme that is a single value
waterfall, where “senior” creditors contract for a first priority claim to all of the
value of the firm. This is also a feature of the terminology used by Douglas Baird
and Anthony Casey with regard to their proposals for “option preservation” and

24 The state law entitlement baseline, articulated in Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979), is a
consistent theme in the articles of both Baird and Jackson. Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy,
36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 730 n.17 (1984); see also Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 187 (1987); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51
U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 109-16 (1984).
25 Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 (“Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal
interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply
because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”).
26 JACKSON, supra note 1, at 21-22.
27 Id. at 9, 21-23, and 64; see also Janger, supra note 9, at 590-92.
28 JACKSON, supra note 1, at 9. It is important to note, for the purpose of future discussion, that
the full Rawlsian bargain would not permit the Butner shortcut, and would insist on the Pareto
superiority of any priority.
29 See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 759, 759 (2011) (“The standard law and economics understanding is that absolute priority follows
inevitably from the ‘creditors’ bargain’ model.”).
30 As Melissa Jacoby and I have explained, state law incorporates a number of important limits on the
scope and priority of security interests, and hence on the ability of a secured creditor to lien the going concern
value of a firm. Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 9, at 706. See also Janger, supra note 9, at 591.
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“relative” priority.31 Reducing entitlements to a single waterfall allows those
allocating the value of a firm to focus only on one valuation question–the value of
the firm as a going concern. The valuation methods discussed in this symposium,
for example, have all been varieties of discounted cash flow or going concern sale
approaches. They, too, all assume a single waterfall.
While this use of the term “absolute priority” to reflect a single hierarchical
priority scheme is commonplace, it is not what the term means under the
Bankruptcy Code and case law when applied to secured creditors’ actual state law
rights. The statutory “absolute priority rule” is embodied in 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1129(b)(2)(B) and (C), which establish the priority of debt over equity and
preferred equity over junior equity in cramdown. Absolute priority instantiates the
rule, stated in Boyd, that old equity cannot participate in a bankruptcy distribution
if a non-consenting class of unsecured creditors are not paid in full.32
There is a similar cramdown priority rule for secured creditors, but it is not
identical.33 The secured creditor’s priority over unsecured debt is asset-based—
limited to the value of their collateral instead of the value of the firm. While the
amount of the debt may exceed the value of the encumbered assets, the priority
does not. The secured creditor gets first claim to the proceeds of their collateral
and retains a lien to the extent of that value, but any deficiency is not entitled to
priority. In other words, on the effective date of the plan, the value of the secured
creditor’s collateral is realized, and their lien is stripped—limited to the “allowed
amount” of the claim.
What, then, is the secured creditor’s collateral on the effective date? That
question is answered by § 552 of the Code. 34 Under 552(a) floating liens stop
floating on the petition date, but, under 552(b) the creditors’ security interest
continues in the “proceeds” of that original collateral, subject to the “equities”
of the case. 35 The secured creditor’s priority, thus, only extends to value that
can be tied to assets liened on the petition date (because floating liens stop

31 Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative Priority, and the Costs of Bankruptcy, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. 785, 786-87 (2017); Casey, supra note 29, at 765.
32 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 503-04 (1913).
33 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2012). Indeed, the difference instantiates the Butner baseline, but also
limits the ability of a secured creditor to participate with equity to violate the Boyd rule, either through a
rollup, or through gifting.
34 Id. § 552.
35 Id. Melissa Jacoby and I develop this point in greater detail in our article, Tracing Equity, supra note 9,
at 688. The key points are (1) that the term “equity” as used in both UCC Article 9 (9-315) and the Code (§
552(b)) invokes the principle of equitable tracing; and (2) that the combined effect of §§ 552(b), 549, and 551
of the Code prevent the interest in proceeds from growing and swallowing up assets and value that were
unencumbered on the petition date. Id. at 693-94, 700-02.

2019]

The Creditors' Bargain Reconstituted

53

floating) and to identifiable (traceable) proceeds of those assets (subject to the
equities of the case). 36
This means that, if a firm continues in operation, rather than liquidating, there
will always be two priority allocation waterfalls: one waterfall to distribute the
realized or realizable value of encumbered assets (an “allowed secured claim”); and
a second waterfall tied to the remaining unencumbered value of the firm
(unsecured “claims” and equity “interests”). The second waterfall thus includes
unencumbered assets, but also the unencumbered residual value of the firm. Even
in the absence of unencumbered assets on the petition date, the second waterfall
includes any going concern value of the firm, as well as any increase in value of
the firm after original collateral is sold (“option value”). The key point here is that a
secured creditor’s deficiency claim against the second “residual” pool of value does not have
priority over unsecured creditors.
In this regard, Barry’s concept of absolute priority diverges (at least as a
terminological matter) from Jackson’s and from that of the Bankruptcy Code
(though not from common parlance). For Barry, priority need not be tied to assets
because it is contractual (though recourse against assets may be a way of enforcing
that contractual priority). For Jackson, to the extent that the justification for
secured creditor priority relies on the Butner principle, rather than an (as yet
unspecified) efficiency rationale, the distributional baseline for the secured creditor
would be the asset-based priority that could have been realized under state law.37
C. Contractualism in Context
In evaluating whether Adler’s contractualism or Jackson’s mandatory
collective remedy is more desirable, it is necessary to place contractualism in
context, and consider the alternatives. Barry’s contractualism is one of (at least)
three current normative proposals regarding value distribution in bankruptcy: two
are novel; one is statutory and historical—traditional, even. The two novel
proposals, contractualism and relativism, require a firm embrace of the “single
waterfall” approach. The third, embodied in the existing Code and state law,
respects absolute priority, but recognizes the two distinct value waterfalls, one
asset-based and one that allocates the residual value of the firm.
36 Id. at 702. The priority of a secured creditor, entitled to adequate protection, is therefore limited in
scope to the realizable value of property that can be liened and perfected under state property law (principally,
but not exclusively, Article 9 of the UCC and state mortgage law).
37 Whether a secured creditor “should” be able to lien all of the value of a firm under state law, is, of
course a separate question, upon which Baird and others have strong views. Baird recognizes the asset-based
nature of the secured claim but continues to assume the possibility of a blanket lien on going-concern value.
Douglas G. Baird, The Rights of Secured Creditors after ResCap, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 849, 860 (noting that the
debate over “[w]hether one looks at a secured creditor as holding the discrete parts worth less than the going
concern or whether it enjoys a right to the first cashflows of the firm . . . will undoubtedly continue . . . . Both
sides cling to their views as if they were articles of religious faith.”).
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1. Single Waterfall Absolutist Contractualism
Adler actually suggests two versions of contractualism, though both are
versions of single waterfall absolutism. He is most attached to “equity based”
absolutism, or as he calls it, “Chameleon Equity.”38 A creditor’s exclusive remedy
would be the right to become an owner of the firm upon default.39 Under this
proposal, a firm would be constructed without debt (recourse collection rights)
but instead with convertible debt.40 On default, equity would be wiped out, debt
would convert to equity and the creditors would gain ownership of the firm and
would be entitled to all of the enterprise’s value.41 This structure is “absolutist”
because it turns on the absolute priority of senior over junior. It is a single
waterfall, because there is only one pool of value—the firm.
Adler recognizes that this structure would not work for an operating business,
but takes comfort that a similar structure has emerged through blanket lien assetbased financing.42 Instead of viewing the firm as the pool of value, one views its
assets as the pool of value, and then, slyly, declares all of the value of the firm
“proceeds” of assets. 43 This move recapitulates contractualism and can mimic
Chameleon Equity because, when you break it down, Chameleon Equity is just an
instant foreclosure device. And, so, as Barry observes, is much of modern
bankruptcy practice.44 Single waterfall absolutism, and contractualism in particular,
lead to a recreation of the race of diligence, but simply move it forward in time.
2. Single Waterfall (Relativist) Collectivism
Baird and Casey take a different approach to the single waterfall. They too
assume that secured claimants have hierarchical priority over unsecured, and
unsecureds have hierarchical priority over equity. 45 More importantly, they treat
the firm as a single value pool, making no distinction between asset-based claims
and pari passu, value-based claims. They find themselves troubled, however, by one
implication of single waterfall absolute priority—realization. Confirmation of a
Chapter 11 plan (and a going concern sale of the debtor) are realization events. The
value of the firm is realized and underwater claimants (the unsecureds) are wiped
out. This deprives the junior creditors of the “option” to postpone reckoning
38 Adler, supra note 2, at 1856; see also Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U.
L. Q. 811 (1994).
39 Adler, supra note 2, at 1856.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1863.
43 Id. at 1862. In a recent article Christopher Frost refers to this as “Effective Entity Priority,” and
highlights its tenuous legal foundation. Christopher W. Frost, Secured Credit and Effective Entity Priority, 49
CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
44 Adler, supra note 2, at 1863.
45 Baird, supra note 31, at 786; Casey, supra note 29, at 763-64.
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beyond plan confirmation. Where a firm continues in operation, as it does in
Chapter 11 through a plan or going concern sale, there is always the chance that the
firm will be successful enough to pay its senior creditors in full and return value to
the juniors. They worry that under a regime of absolute priority for the secureds,
disposition of the collateral by the secured party allocates all of the upside value of
the firm to the seniors and wipes out the unsecureds.46 In their view, the “option
value” is owned by the juniors and must be cashed out if the firm is sold. 47
3. Dual Waterfall (Collective) Absolutism
Baird and Casey are right to be concerned about this implication of “single
waterfall” absolutism, but the problem is not “absolute priority,” it is the single
waterfall. In a recent article, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter
11, Melissa Jacoby and I argue for a third approach.48 Our approach retains the
idea of absolute priority based on state law entitlements, but recognizes that there
are actually two waterfalls—one asset-based, and the other value-based. We
carefully explicate the value allocation and realization rules embodied in existing
law.49 Then, we argue (again, like Inigo Montoya) that, under current law, absolute
priority does not mean what most people think it means.50 Then we explain the
normative superiority of our positive version over either of the “novel” regimes
described above; it does not wipe out the interest of the unsecureds in the value
of the firm, nor does it deprive the secured creditor of the value of their collateral.51
We characterize the current regime as “dual waterfall, two-point realization.”
The first difference between us and the “single waterfallers” is our view that
there are two distinct hierarchies applied to state law entitlements: the asset-based
waterfall (defined in 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 552, and 1129(b)(2)(A)); and the valuebased waterfall (defined in §§ 502, 507, and 1129(b)(2)(B)). The Bankruptcy Code
differentiates claims with asset-based priority from claims against the residual
value of the firm.52 Creditors with claims against specific assets lose their
foreclosure rights but are entitled to the monetary value of their liens. Creditors
Baird, supra note 31, at 786; Casey, supra note 29, at 764-65.
Baird, supra note 31, at 791; Casey, supra note 29, at 765. Baird and Casey describe plan confirmation
as “destroying” option value. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 29, at 760. This is a misnomer. Option value is never
destroyed, it is simply transferred upon disposition. If collateral is sold, the purchaser receives the benefit—
and risk—of ownership. To the extent that the value of the upside is positive, that value should be realized as
part of the purchase price. If the secured creditor wants to realize on the value of its collateral by selling the
firm, it has to reach a deal with the juniors to purchase that option.
48 Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 9.
49 Id. at 682-709.
50 Id. at 678-80.
51 Id. at 709-21.
52 This mimics the priority for a solvent firm when it is sold. Debt claims are paid before equity. And,
in the race of diligence, the debt claimants have recourse to the value of the assets before equity gets anything.
Bankruptcy converts the liquidation right into a claim to residual value of the firm.
46
47
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with no claim to specific assets have a claim to the residual assets and goingconcern value of the firm that is senior to equity.
The second difference is that we take a different view of realization than Adler
or Baird and Casey. In a world of blanket lien financing and underwater seconds,
Barry’s contractual approach would treat bankruptcy as a realization moment for
unsecureds—often taking nothing. While the secureds would have the power to
choose between realization (sale) or ownership (plan or credit bid). Baird and Casey
are concerned about this aspect of absolutism.53 Absolute priority turns bankruptcy,
or at least plan confirmation into a realization event. The senior creditors gain
ownership of the firm, while out of the money juniors are deprived of any option
value—the upside is foreclosed. They remedy this by allocating to the unsecureds
the value of an option on the value of the firm in excess of the secured creditors
debt. 54 In other words, the unsecured creditors retain some value, but they are
subordinated to the undersecured blanket lien claimant’s deficiency claim.
We, by contrast, recognize and accept that plan confirmation and/or
disposition of the collateral operate as realization events for both secured creditors
and unsecured creditors. Collateral disposition operates as a realization event for
the secureds and they are entitled only to the value of their assets (including
appreciation prior to disposition and any identifiable proceeds), while the
unsecureds can choose, through the plan process, between realization (sale) or
ownership (plan). The key difference between us and the single waterfallers is that,
subject to adequate protection, any value that cannot be traced to encumbered
assets is allocated to the estate. This includes going concern value that could not
be realized without bankruptcy. Where there is significant going concern or
synergistic value preserved through bankruptcy, that value is allocated to the
unsecured creditors (including the secured creditor’s deficiency, if any). This, in
our view, is the approach that the Bankruptcy Code envisions. Indeed, it was
enacted at a time when asset-based lending was relatively more piecemeal than
today. It is also more faithful to the state law baseline, and, therefore closer to the
“Rawlsian/Jacksonian” bargain than either of the competing proposals.
III. THE NORMATIVE SUPERIORITY OF DUAL WATERFALL
ABSOLUTISM: THE LEGAL LIMITS OF CONTRACTUALISM
This, of course, leads to the ultimate question: which approach is normatively
superior? Is “dual waterfall” collectivism normatively preferable to single waterfall
collectivism or contractualism? Again, Melissa Jacoby and I discuss this question
in greater detail elsewhere, but I will summarize our argument here, and tie it with
a new collectivist bow, based on the Creditors’ Bargain.
53
54

See supra note 47.
See supra note 47.
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A. The Creditors Bargain Reconstituted
Basic corporate finance explains that governance rights should go to the
juniormost variable claimant who is in the money—the fulcrum. That is the
investor who bears the downside risk and benefits from the upside. When a firm
becomes insolvent, creditors who once thought they were fixed become variable.
Thus, the creditors who bargain in the original position about insolvency will
anticipate two flavors of debt claim against an insolvent debtor: “still fixed” and
“now variable.” And, where the original position contains multiple priority levels,
they would add a twist: “still fixed”; “now partially fixed”; and “now variable.”
Under the law of most jurisdictions (other than the United States), insolvency
is a realization moment for the old variable claimants (equity), but also for the fixed
and formerly fixed claimants.55 Fiduciary duties shift, and often mandate
commencing a bankruptcy (usually liquidation proceeding). 56 In liquidation, the
single waterfall is descriptively accurate, as all of the value is asset derived. The firm
winds up, wiping out equity, and distributing the value of the assets first to those
with a priority claim to the assets, and then any remainder to the residual,
unsecured creditors.
If, however, this immediate realization through liquidation is likely to be
inefficient, either because it will yield fire sale prices or sacrifice going concern
value, the creditors in the original position should want to try to come up with a
way out of the box. They will prefer, if possible, to delay realization to maximize
value. This is what Chapter 11 does; realization is delayed (in order to preserve
going concern value). The question is, what treatment would be chosen for the
senior (still fixed) and junior (now variable) by the creditors in the original
position assuming they don’t know who they will be?
In our view, juniors (and in an operating business there will always be
dispersed juniors) will not agree to full subordination, because it basically turns
them into variable claimants at the outset, but without the benefit of any upside.
They get wiped out along with equity. Nobody would lend into such a junior
position. In the original position, the juniors would not agree to Adler’s single
waterfall absolutism. Instead, the argument is that they would choose a version of
reset that will maximize the value of their now variable claim while respecting the
rights of the seniors.

See, e.g., Insolvency Act of 1986, c.45, § 214 (Eng.).
See UNITED NATIONS, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, PART FOUR:
DIRECTORS’ OBLIGATIONS IN THE PERIOD APPROACHING INSOLVENCY (2013),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Leg-Guide-Insol-Part4-ebook-E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SK54-NH6Y].
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B. The Global Legal Norm of Adequate Capitalization
This is where the two collective approaches diverge along the single versus dual
waterfall axis. One must determine the extent of the seniors’ priority. We argue
that the proper version is to reset the secured creditor’s fixed claim to the value of
the assets and then require the juniors and the undersecured portion of the senior’s
debt to share pari passu. This is also what the Bankruptcy Code does through
§§ 1129(b) and 506. Baird and Casey assume that a blanket lien can encumber the
entire value of a firm, including its going concern value, and therefore limit the
post-default reset to the value of the firm in excess of the lienholder’s debt.57
Our approach has three features to recommend it: (1) antijudgment proofing;
(2) antirollup (Boyd); and (3) proper governance incentives.
Both of the single waterfall approaches encourage judgment proofing. If a
debtor can borrow at a low interest rate by granting priority to one creditor
without compensating nonconsensual or nonadjusting creditors, then doing so will
increase equity’s return on investment by artificially reducing the cost of capital.
This point is not new. The drafters of prerevision Article 9 noted this tendency
wistfully when they validated floating liens.58 LoPucki made the argument
forcefully when he advocated a priority for tort claims in his articles, The Unsecured
Creditors’ Bargain and The Death of Liability.59 Elizabeth Warren, Bebchuck, and
Fried similarly proposed a carveout from the secured creditors’ lien to reinstate
the lamented equity cushion.60

57
58

Baird, supra note 31, at 802; Casey, supra note 29, at 790.
Comment 2 to 9-204 provides:

This Article accepts the principle of a “continuing general lien”. It rejects the doctrine-of which
the judicial attitude toward after-acquired property interests was one expression-that there is reason
to invalidate as a matter of law what has been variously called the floating charge, the free-handed
mortgage, and the lien on a shifting stock. This Article validates a security interest in the debtor’s
existing and future assets, even though . . . the debtor has liberty to use or dispose of collateral
without being required to account for proceeds or substitute new collateral . . . .
The widespread nineteenth century prejudice against the floating charge was based on a
feeling, often inarticulate in the opinions, that a commercial borrower should not be allowed to
encumber all his assets present and future, and that for the protection not only of the borrower but
of his other creditors a cushion of free assets should be preserved. That inarticulate premise has
much to recommend it. This Article decisively rejects it not on the ground that it was wrong in policy but
on the ground that it was not effective.
U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1972) (emphasis added).
59 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1996) (showing that modern
technology and lending practices, including secured credit, facilitate judgment proofing and undercut the
effectiveness of traditional liability rules); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV.
1887, 1939-40 (1994).
60 See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (1996); Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The
Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1390-91 (1997).
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Indeed, while Article 9 validates floating liens, this is only part of the picture
with regard to adequate capitalization. One would expect that the junior creditors
in the original position would insist that a firm that conducts business should
maintain adequate capital to internalize the risks of its operations, both to nonconsensual creditors and those it owes a contractual obligation. The state law
baseline is not insensitive to this. There are a wide variety of legal doctrines that
enforce a norm of adequate capitalization through both liability and property
rules. These include fiduciary duties, fraudulent conveyance law, and veil piercing,
among others. Where the debtor has not retained a reasonable level of free assets
to pay its creditors, the secured creditors’ lien may be invaded.61
As a matter of tort theory this makes sense. If one takes a Calabresian
perspective, the law of torts should allocate losses where the costs of bargaining
are high and put the burden of the loss on the least cost avoider.62 The problem is
that a liability rule offers no help, as the assets are already gone. Fraudulent
conveyance law, fiduciary duties, and veil piercing therefore enforce this norm by
looking to the lienholders, managers, and the owners.
Bankruptcy law is not the only legal doctrine that limits the ability of creditors
to contract around the separation between asset-based and value-based claims—
the dual waterfall. There are a number of anti-subordination or anti-rollup
doctrines outside of bankruptcy. Marshalling rules for example require a creditor
to look to assets that are not subject to a junior interest.
The most important example of an antirollup rule is the property doctrine of
equitable merger. When a mortgage holder comes into ownership of the fee, the
mortgage merges into the fee and cannot be foreclosed. All of the single waterfall
approaches violate this principle and allow the debtor to do business without
worrying about their nonfinancial creditors.63 Where the single waterfall extends
to all of the value of the firm, the secured creditor and the debtor have contracted
around the doctrine of merger. They violate the spirit of Boyd in the name of
“absolute priority.”
Thus, the dual waterfall serves the goal of preventing rollups by preventing the
senior creditor and the debtor from contracting around the distinction between
financial creditors and operational creditors. It insures that the risks of operating a
business will always remain with the juniormost claimants, and that equity will not
be able to contract with a senior claimant to squeeze out an intermediate class.

61 Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 9, at 709-10.
62 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 58 (1970).
63 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.32[1] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2016). The question of whether

a merger occurs depends on the intent of the parties. In re Apex Carpet Finishers, Inc., 585 F.2d 1323, 1325
(5th Cir. 1978); Downstate Nat’l Bank v. Elmore, 587 N.E.2d 90, 94 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992).
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C. The Single Waterfall in a Torts First World
Judgment proofing is a significant fly in the contractualist ointment. Barry
acknowledges in The Creditors’ Bargain Revisited,64 as well as in his earlier work, 65
that there is no justification for subordinating non-consensual creditors to a
contractual waterfall. They did not assent, and they did not have notice. As such,
the ability to shift risk to these creditors creates moral hazard. Debtors and
consensual creditors will have an incentive to judgment proof. Accordingly,
Barry would give involuntary claimants priority over the blanket lien creditor. 66
Here, he is undoubtedly right. However, this means that Barry’s absolutism is
not so absolute.
Indeed, the exception may swallow the rule. The great fear of the dual
waterfall, as articulated by Adler, Baird, and Casey, is that it requires a costly
valuation process. The threat of costly valuation hearings, they fear, will allow the
juniors to extort value from the seniors. As Barry puts it, they lead to a “feast for
lawyers”—an imbroglio.67 But Barry’s torts-first contractualism does not avoid
valuation hearings. Once torts are at the head of the distribution queue, ahead of
the blanket lien lender, you need to value the tort claim. This can be just as time
consuming and messy as valuing the assets.
How big a hole are we talking about? Perhaps large—tax claimants, utilities,
product liability claimants, and even certain business torts. Even in the absence
of a tort of wrongful trading or deepening insolvency, fraud, constructive
fraudulent conveyance, and veil piercing for undercapitalization may all become
part of the mix. In short, while this may not be a bad thing, it eliminates most of
the benefit of contractualism or, for that matter, relativism. Once torts are put
first, Barry’s contractualism will still require complicated ex post valuations.
Indeed, they will likely be more complicated valuation exercises than simply
setting the value for ascertainable assts.
D. The Practical Limits of Absolute Priority
There is a possible response to our view. Douglas Baird, in his article Priority
Matters, points out that the restructurings of most modern large companies are
purely financial, leaving the trade, the employees (at least those still employed) and
many other junior creditors unimpaired.68 To the extent that contractualism simply
applies to financial creditors and not to operating creditors, then the creditors are

Adler, supra note 2, at 1856 n.10.
Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 311 (1993).
66 Adler, supra note 2, at 1856 n.10.
67 Id. at 1854; see also SOL STEIN, BANKRUPTCY: A FEAST FOR LAWYERS 303 (1989).
68 Baird, supra note 31, at 796-97.
64
65
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free to choose between Barry’s absolutism and Baird and Casey’s relativism. If
operational creditors are not being asked to take a haircut, it is hard to object.
But the empirical claim appears overdrawn. Modern practice is full of devices
that are designed to allow the debtor to choose which unsecured creditors to impair
and which to subject to a haircut. Critical vendor motions, employee retention
plans, and even assumption of executory contracts do allow the debtor to pay those
creditors whose services or cooperation are essential. The problem is that not all
modern bankruptcies are “financial,” and not all operational creditors remain
relational at the time of bankruptcy.
This point cuts in both directions. First, it may make restructuring too
expensive: airline, industrial, and municipal bankruptcies are, by and large, aimed
at addressing legacy labor issues. In those cases, where relational creditors are being
asked to take a haircut, collectivism and the dual waterfall are crucial. Second, there
are equality of distribution concerns. Not all relational creditors remain relational
at the time of bankruptcy. No-longer-critical vendors get wiped out, while
currently-critical vendors get paid in full. When operational and non-consensual
creditors are being asked to share the burden of continuing the business, it is
important that principles of equal treatment and best interests (Rawls’s “difference
principle” resurfaces here) be respected, and that a pool of capital remains available
to pay those formerly operational creditors.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, Barry’s report of the death of collectivism may be somewhat
exaggerated and respect for “absolute priority” is essential. However, in neither
case do the terms mean what Barry thinks they mean. Indeed, once they are
properly understood, the approach followed in the Bankruptcy Code, and the
Creditors’ Bargain, as Jacoby and I have reconstituted it, is normatively superior to
either Barry’s contractualism or the relativists’ collectivism.
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